Defendants have asserted that five "principles" must be applied to ascertain the amount of attorneys' fees to which Plaintiffs are entitled, to wit: (1) the Court must assess what hours spent were "reasonable;" (2) the Court must require proper documentation of the hours spent;[18] (3) duplicative time must not be deemed compensable;[19] (4) claims reflecting inefficient use of hours must be discounted; and (5) in balancing the "public interest" of the litigation, the Court should discount the amount requested because Plaintiffs have not prevailed. The first four of these general principles are clearly warranted and undisputed. Copeland v. Marshall, At 891-892, 900-903; Jordan v. United States Department of Justice, 89 F.R.D. 537, at 541 (D.D.C. 1981). Regarding the fifth "principle," the Court in Copeland noted that the nature of success should be considered in adjusting the fee "under the rubric of `quality of representation.'" At 893. As this Court has already noted, however, all of Plaintiffs' counsel were "highly competent and thorough in their presentation of this litigation."[20] While application of this fifth "principle" may prove to be relevant in a different context, it is useless here.